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Abstract. We investigate known security flaws in the context of security
ceremonies to gain an understanding of the ceremony analysis process.
The term security ceremonies is used to describe a system of protocols
and humans which interact for a specific purpose. Security ceremonies
and ceremony analysis is an area of research in its infancy, and we explore
the basic principles involved to better understand the issues involved. We
analyse three ceremonies, HTTPS, EMV and Opera Mini, and use the
information gained from the experience to establish a list of typical flaws
in ceremonies. Finally, we use that list to analyse a protocol proven secure
for human use. This leads to a realisation of the strengths and weaknesses
of ceremony analysis.
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1 Introduction
In 1993 Bellare and Rogaway introduced a model for reductionist security proofs
for cryptographic key exchange protocols [4]. Since this time, many crypto-
graphic protocols have been accompanied by a reductionist security proof.
A reductionist security proof means that the security of the protocol is re-
duced to a known hard mathematical problem, such that if an advantage is
achieved over the protocol, then there will be some significant advantage over
the known hard problem. If a protocol is proven secure in this way then, as long
as the “hard” mathematical problems remain sufficiently hard, the protocol is
unbreakable within the defined security model.
Unfortunately, many protocols so proven to be secure in theory, have been
found to be insecure in practice, when deployed in the real world. This inequality
between the theoretical security and the actual security can be traced back to a
deficiency in the security proof model. The mathematical security models while
useful, especially for examining the security of a protocol in isolation, do not
take into account the wide range of side channel attacks, social engineering, and
interfaces to other protocols and the environment, which occur in the real world.
In 2007, Ellison wrote that a more robust method for examining the security
of a protocol was to consider a security ceremony [7]. Ellison wrote with reference
to network protocols, but we can extend that work to any group of protocols.
A security ceremony may be described as protocols in their context of use. For
example, the protocol HTTPS provides a connection secure from eavesdroppers
between two nodes on a network. However a security ceremony would include
a user, viewing a website on their computer, and using HTTPS via their web
browser running on the computer to securely connect to another computer on
the network. We will show that while ceremony analysis is powerful enough to
capture known attacks, each use case of a given set of protocols is a new ceremony
and requires its own ceremony analysis.
1.1 Related Work
The concept of a ceremony was developed earlier than 2007 [8]. In the years
since 2007, there has been an increasing trend to meld information security
with the social sciences, as indicated by conferences both in the U.S.A1 and
in Europe2. This multi-disciplinary approach brings into context the human
usage of information security systems. As Shostack and Stewart state, “. . . our
approach to information security is flawed” and “the way forward cannot be
found solely in mathematics or technology” [18].
Although little progress has been made regarding ceremonies since 2007, a
number of researchers in different areas have agreed that ceremony analysis is
a promising research direction. These research areas include formal methods,
network security, and applied cryptography.
In the formal methods’ security community, there has been a call to include
parts of ceremony analysis in the formal methods’ analysis of protocols [12]. This
work has been further developed in Martina et al’s more recent work in the PKI
context [13]. Martina et al used the verification method outlined by Ruksenas et
al. [16,17], adapted using Bella’s goal availability principles [2], to address the
open question that Ellison posed as to how to model human behaviour.
In the network security community, the concept of a ceremony has been
used to describe protocols which include humans, and thus to create more ro-
bust security ceremonies [11]. Karlof et al. describe a concept of conditioned-safe
ceremonies, based on a defence-in-depth approach adapted from the human relia-
bility community. Central to their approach is the use of forcing functions whose
property is to prevent a user from proceeding, until a critical step is completed.
In the applied cryptography community, Ellison’s ceremonies have been used
as a basis for modelling authentication ceremonies involving humans [5]. In the
authentication ceremony described by Brainard et al., a human who still has
their primary authentication details intact, the helper, vouches for another per-
sonally known human who has lost their authentication details (the asker). This
vouching process, an extra factor in identification of the asker, allows emergency
authentication details to be provided.
1 http://weis2010.econinfosec.org
2 http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/shb10/
There is a large body of work on such topics as phishing on the internet,
and social engineering in general [6,10]. This reflects the common understanding
that many security decisions are based on trust, such as trust in a brand, rather
than the mathematical assurances of a correctly executed protocol. For this
reason, ceremony analysis provides a more complete understanding of the issues
surrounding the use of a protocol by a human, than protocol analysis alone.
1.2 Contribution
We reinterpret recently identified security flaws in the context of ceremonies, and
use this information to establish a list of typical flaws in ceremonies. We apply the
knowledge learned from analysing previously identified security flaws to analyse
a protocol including a human which has been proven secure. In doing so, we
show that ceremony analysis is powerful, in that it can capture and describe all
of the known issues investigated, and highlight flaws in a protocol proven secure.
However, the process yielded the knowledge that ceremony analysis is analysis
of one particular “use case” of a (set of) protocol(s). This knowledge leads to
the realization of a limitation of ceremony analysis, which is that if the context
of the set of protocols is changed then what was secure may no longer be secure
(a different context, even for the same set of protocols, is a different ceremony).
1.3 Outline
In the next section we give an overview of ceremonies and reinvestigate the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) ceremony from Ellison. After this
introduction to ceremonies, the analysis of the Opera Mini ceremony is shown.
We analyse three ceremony investigations, including an investigation of an EMV
(Europay, MasterCard and VISA) ceremony not shown due to space constraints,
and discuss the findings. We then use the lessons learned from the analysis of
these known flaws to analyse a protocol which has been proven secure using an
adversarial security model. Finally, we outline the strengths and weaknesses of
ceremony analysis.
2 Ceremonies
Ellison wrote about security ceremonies in 2007 [7]. In this paper, he attributed
the name ceremony as being coined for this purpose by Jesse Walker. Ellison
provided several central ideas in a network security context, which can be di-
rectly applied to cryptographic protocols in general. The properties of a security
ceremony that we distil from Ellison’s work are as follows:
– a ceremony is a superset of protocols;
– there is nothing out-of-band; and
– humans, when part of the ceremony, are explicitly included.
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Fig. 1. HTTPS Ceremony, of Ellison (2007)
2.1 Ceremonies Example: HTTPS with MITM Attack
HTTPS is a protocol used on the internet to provide confidentiality and integrity
to messages between two parties. An example HTTPS ceremony derived from
Ellison’s paper is shown in Figure 1. This ceremony has a number of parts,
between multiple “nodes” or parties. First, on the right hand side of Figure 1, is
the root key distribution part of the ceremony. The nodes in this key distribution
process have been denoted by CA, R and C. Here the certificate authority is
represented by CA, and R represents the registration authority which involves
a number of human steps between the CA and the human party C. The human
C will use the key from the CA on C’s computer CC. The messages for placing
the key on C’s computer CC are shown in messages 1 to 3. Notice that there is
no time scale on the ceremony.
The attack is shown between the user C, and the user’s computer CC and
the server S, in messages 4 to 6. The attack is carried out via two adversaries,
A1 and A2. At some time after the user’s computer CC is set up ready to take
part in HTTPS, adversary A2 sends a name (server S’s name) and an address
(adversary A1’s address) to the computer CC. User C decides whether or not
to proceed to the server based on the server’s name alone, because the software
running on CC does not present both the name and address to user C, only the
name.
From here, the ceremony proceeds as expected through messages 7 to 22,
and hence the attack. User C’s computer, CC, securely connects to adversary
A1 (messages 7 to 10) using HTTPS, adversary A1 securely connects to server
S (messages 11 to 14) using HTTPS, and then the adversary A1 faithfully relays
communication between the user’s computer CC and the server S. Specifically
A1 passes on the login and password information, which adversary A1 now has
in plaintext form for the future (note the decryption and re-encryption between
messages 21 and 22 for the password, and similarly for the login). After message
22, adversary A1 is securely logged into server S, and is free to proceed as desired.
Ellison’s example ceremony presumes that only the name of the target, and
not the target’s web address, is passed on to the human through the web browser
in message 5, for the human to make their decision on. If this is the case, then
this is clearly an issue that will result in the security of the ceremony being
compromised. Some readers may suggest that this should not be the case any
longer, due to such advances as extended certificates which have been introduced
since 2007 (http://www.cabforum.org/). However, in a recent study by the
authors which asked the participants to log their web usage security decisions
for a week, not one participant based any of their security decisions in a week
of web use on any of the information made available by the extended certificate
enhancements [15]. Also, extended certificates are not yet mandated for use in
HTTPS. Hence the issue remains current. Further, even if the address, as well as
the name, is displayed to the user to base their security decision on, Ellison asks
whether the human user will be provisioned ahead of time with the association
between the address of the server and the name of the server, and the correctness
of the name [7].
The above means that, in the ceremony shown in Figure 1, the user (C)
believes that their computer (CC) is securely connected to the server (S). Indeed,
CC is securely connected to something, just not the intended server. The point
is that the HTTPS protocol is not broken, there are successful usages of the
protocol between CC and A1, and between A1 and S. But the security ceremony,
which includes the HTTPS protocol, is fatally flawed.
3 Opera Mini Ceremony
Opera Software ASA is a company which develops a suite of multi-platform
web browsing software programs (http://www.opera.com/company/). Opera
has had the greatest market share of any mobile web browser in the world,
for the last 12 months 3. There are different versions of Opera web browsers for
different purposes. The three main variations of the browser being:
– standard Opera for PC/Mac
– Opera Mini for mobile telephones
– Opera Mobile for devices such as PDAs
3 http://gs.statcounter.com/#mobile_browser-ww-monthly-200911-201010
3.1 Opera Mini Design
Opera Mini is the version for devices such as mobile telephones, which have
restricted computing power and resources. Opera Mini has no full rendering
engine on the device (http://www.opera.com/mobile/specs/). Instead, Opera
has proprietary servers which handle the internet requests made on the mobile.
This process of sending requests to the internet via a server which handles
the rendering and compresses the data before sending the resulting page back to
the mobile telephone, has benefits both in a reduction of the computing power
required on the device, and also reduced bandwidth requirements to the device
which is running Opera Mini. The issue from a security point of view is that there
is no end-to-end security. The requests from the mobile telephone to Opera’s
server are encrypted using Opera’s proprietary encryption, but the messages are
decrypted from Opera’s proprietary encryption at the Opera server, and then
the data is re-encrypted using standard HTTPS and the certificate of the actual
target website (http://www.opera.com/mobile/help/faq/#security). As the
Opera Mini FAQ on security reads:
“To be able to do this translation, the Opera Mini server needs to have
access to the unencrypted version of the webpage. Therefore no end-to-
end encryption between the client and the remote web server is possi-
ble. If you need full end-to-end encryption, you should use a full web
browser. . . ”
(http://www.opera.com/mobile/help/faq/#security)
3.2 Opera Mini Ceremony Analysis
Opera mini’s use in a mobile phone is a quintessential security ceremony. There is
one protocol between Opera’s server and the internet, another protocol between
the mobile telephone and Opera’s server, and finally there is a human user
making security decisions based on what they see on the browser on their mobile
telephone.
Of particular interest in the Opera Mini ceremony is the use of standard
icons to indicate security to the user. In, for example, Internet Explorer, which
almost one in two desktop users currently use worldwide4, the use of the padlock
symbol means that the connection between the user and the website the user is
interacting with is secure via use of HTTPS. By secure, we mean that confiden-
tiality and integrity are assured such that no computer on the path between the
user and the website can decrypt any of the information or change the message
that is sent by the user or the website. The padlock icon is used similarly in all
other major browsers.
However, as shown in Figure 2, Opera Mini displays a padlock symbol (top
right of picture) when there is not end-to-end security. This means that Opera
Mini users, who know what the padlock symbol means in other browsers, are
led to believe that they have a confidential connection to the website they are
viewing, when they do not.
4 http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-ww-monthly-200907-201008
Fig. 2. Opera Mini Secure Connection (http://www.opera.com/mobile/demo/ view-
ing NAB’s secure logon page)
Fig. 3. Opera Mini Ceremony
Figure 3 describes the Opera Mini ceremony. The ceremony begins with the
user of a mobile telephone typing the address of their bank’s website into the
Opera Mini web browser (message 1). A process similar to HTTPS then occurs
between the mobile telephone and Opera’s Server (approximated by messages 2
to 5). As Opera ASA states:
The communication is protected by 256-bit RC4 and the key exchange
is done by 1280-bit RSA. All hashes are created using SHA-256. These
are the algorithms used by most SSL sites today. (http://www.opera.
com/mobile/help/faq/#security)
A HTTPS connection is also formed between Opera’s server and the bank’s
server (messages 6 to 9). Once this is complete, the request for the page is
passed through to the bank (messages 10 and 11), and the bank replies with
its customer login page (message 12). The Opera server renders this page, and
sends the compressed output to the user’s mobile telephone device (message 13).
On the mobile telephone, Opera Mini then displays the webpage, including the
padlock symbol (message 14). The user sees the padlock symbol, and chooses
whether to input their login information and password. If the user does enter
their login and password (message 15), then this is sent back to the bank’s server
via the Opera encrypted channel (message 16), decrypted at the Opera Server,
and then re-encrypted and sent on to the bank’s server via the HTTPS encrypted
channel (message 17).
In a recent study, our research team investigated security decisions made
by users in a week of standard web usage. We found that most users made
the choice of whether or not to interact with websites that had direct financial
interfaces, such as banks or online retail, based on whether or not the padlock
symbol was shown [15]. Users presumed that a padlock meant that no one, apart
from the website they were communicating with, could see their financial details
and confidential information, such as login and password, in plaintext form.
Opera’s intimation of confidentiality by the depiction of the padlock symbol
is not in keeping with Opera’s statement in the Opera Mini FAQ which says
“if you need full end-to-end encryption, you should use a full web browser. . . ”
(http://www.opera.com/mobile/help/faq/#security).
Interestingly, while the plaintext state of messages through the Opera Server
clearly is a security issue and probably not realised by most Opera Mini users,
the design has some security benefits. If the user trusts Opera Mini with all
their communication with every party they communicate with on the internet,
then this design of accessing the internet through a proxy provides essentially
anonymous internet usage, as well as protection against various JavaScript-based
malicious software (malware).
4 Lessons Learned
By re-investigating known security flaws from a ceremony point of view, we
identified a set of common flaws. These ceremonies included the EMV ceremony
described by Murdoch et al., but these were left out of this paper due to space
constraints [14]. This list included:
– each individual protocol remained secure, but the critical security informa-
tion was not passed from one protocol to the next;
– the information passed on to the human was inadequate for the human to
have any chance of making a correct decision;
– it is clear that lessons long since learned for protocols, have not been trans-
ferred into security ceremony knowledge.
While ceremony analysis has been demonstrated to capture known flaws, and
therefore is useful, the technique is not without pitfalls. The most significant flaw
is highlighted by our definition for a ceremony, stated in Section 1, which was
that security ceremonies were protocols in their context of use. This means that,
even if the underlying protocols are found to be secure for a given context,
they may well not be secure in even a slightly different context, leading to the
situation of requiring a new ceremony analysis for the same set of protocols in
each new context.
All of the ceremonies examined have been use cases, the context of use, of
the underlying protocols, and therefore the first job of the ceremony analyser is
to create a list of use cases to create a rigorous security proof for. Of particular
concern for the ceremony analysis technique are areas where the context of use
for the protocols, for a specific ceremony, do not yet exist. Ceremony analysis will
therefore, by necessity, trail behind users’ use of any given system. For example,
the people responsible for the security of new smart card driver licenses will
only be able to analyse certain security ceremonies once users of the smart card
have been interacting with (potentially previously unknown) third parties. This
interaction with new third parties may be a new context, and hence a new
ceremony will be created which will be able to be analysed only in retrospect.
This is a significant step down from the ideals of provable security, which aims
to ensure that, once a protocol is proven secure, it will be secure regardless of
how it is used.
Therefore the common flaws revealed in the ceremonies analysed to date
suggest these assessments which should be completed on security ceremonies
prior to deployment.
– Look for protocol-like deficiencies, such as outlined in [1]. Treat each con-
stituent protocol as a node in the ceremony, and check that nonces and
identification are being passed between nodes.
– Ensure that key cryptographic information is being transferred between
nodes in the ceremony.
– If the ceremony includes a protocol including a human as part of the protocol,
and if the protocol comes with a proof of security, re-examine the proof of
security for the assumptions that were made concerning the human.
– Examine the human’s role in the ceremony. If the only way for the human
to accomplish their goal is via a particular route through a security decision
point, the human will take that route.
– Examine the human-factor considerations of the ceremony. These issues in-
clude how many items a human can remember (for example, web address and
store name pairs, as per the HTTPS ceremony) and the prior knowledge and
education required. For example, in approving the usage of a HTTPS cere-
mony, do humans realise that the most critical information is the address?
Our recent study indicated that they did not.
5 Investigation of a Provably Secure Protocol
In 2008, Gajek et al. expanded on Bellare and Rogaway’s concept of practice
oriented provable security [3]. The significant enhancement that Gajek et al.
made to previous security models was that they proved a protocol including a
human to be secure [9]. They achieved this by adding formal actions render and
recognise to a security model. Render is the process of a web browser rendering a
HTML page, based on the browser’s state, and presenting that page to the user.
Recognise is the process of a user viewing the webpage, judging if the Human-
Perceptable Authenticator (HPA) is correct, and outputting either true or false
depending on the results of that test.
The protocol that Gajek et al. proved to be secure, what they called browser-
based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS, is a non-trivial security cer-
emony. In the protocol, there is a user who has a computer, a browser running
on the user’s computer, and the user is interacting with a server via their com-
puter’s browser. Gajek et al. take the important step of extending the definition
of the underlying TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol to include the human
user. In the protocol, the user types the address of the server into their browser,
the TLS HTTPS connection is created between the server and the browser, the
server then sends a HPA to the user via the browser (which renders the HPA).
If the user recognises the HPA, then they type in their login credentials. In this
way, the server is authenticated to the user (via the HPA) and the user is au-
thenticated to the server (via the traditional login and password technique). For
the full Gajek et al protocol, see [9].
We analysed the Gajek protocol using the lessons learned via our analysis of
the previously outlined security ceremonies. We make the following observations.
– The protocol begins with the human typing in the web address of the server.
This immediately removes one significant source of failing by the user (web
address of target incorrect), which was specifically outlined in the HTTPS
Ceremony shown in section 2.1. So the question is only, “Could an adversary,
who is not the server, supply the user with a HPA which will cause the user
to enter their username and password?”
– Many assumptions are rolled into the browser’s render and the human’s
recognise capabilities. For example, since it is not specified in the protocol,
there is every chance that a website (and browser) designer implementing
this protocol would not put in any check to ensure that the HPA (typically
a picture) is fully shown before the user can type in their user name and
password. On a slow connection, users may well type in their details prior
to seeing some, or all, of the HPA. Further, even if such a check was put in
place (picture fully downloaded and shown prior to displaying login details
entry form), the protocol could still be broken via sending an all black or
all grey with a red cross in the middle picture. Many users may view these
pictures as a download or rendering fault, and still enter their user name
and password.
– Another potential attack is to degrade or pixelate the picture. There will
be storage space and bandwidth decisions made concerning the file format,
size, and resolution of the HPA, by at least all three of the owners of the
server, the webpage developer, and the web browser developer. As written,
these decisions are left to the individual developers with no necessity for
a common technique. The essential message, from both this and the prior
point, is the need for protocol developers to include in their protocol design,
and hence protocol proof, the specification of the critical elements of the
designs of the interface to the human.
– How does the user know that this is the protocol? The user does not know
the algorithm, does not know that suddenly they should be waiting for a
HPA. This suggests that there is no need to attack this protocol at all, and
the adversary should create a different protocol. Therefore, once this issue
is realised, as part of a security ceremony potential solutions such as side-
channel instructions to the user about the protocol may be necessary.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that security flaws in complex systems of protocols, with human
interaction, can be analysed using security ceremonies. The analysis of the EMV
smart card ceremony (omitted due to space constraints) and the Opera Mini
ceremony, followed by the analysis of the TLS protocol which had been proven
secure for human use, shows that a ceremony analysis is capable of capturing a
greater range of security flaws than protocol analysis alone.
In the process of analysing these ceremonies, we have constructed an ap-
proach for analysing further security ceremonies. We also highlight the role that
the designer plays in ensuring that the ceremony is secure. This role necessitates
a grounding in security considerations, and similarly that creators of protocols
are aware of typical design considerations at the human-computer interface.
Finally, the realisation that security ceremonies are essentially use cases of
the underlying protocols, warns against the presumption that a protocol shown
secure in one ceremony will mean that the same protocol is secure in another
ceremony. The development of a list of use cases for the protocol, or device
such as a smart card, becomes critical, as is the use standardized protocols that
either are provably secure or have been rigorously scrutinized. This work may
be similar to the construction of a safety case for mission critical systems.
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